Interrogating Nigeria’s Federal System: Between Centralisation and The Quest for True Federalism

Abstract

Nigeria’s federal system, established at independence in 1960, has long been criticised for deviating from the core principles of genuine federalism. This study therefore evaluates the extent to which Nigeria’s constitutional and operational frameworks align with normative federalism, focusing on power devolution, fiscal federalism, and governance outcomes. Employing a qualitative approach grounded in classical and contemporary federalism theories, the research combines documentary analysis with primary data from 20 purposively selected elite structured interviews across selected states in Nigeria. Key informants included political scientists, constitutional lawyers, senior public officials, policymakers, and civil society leaders engaged in federalism debates. Secondary sources comprised the 1999 Constitution (as amended), policy statements, constitutional conference reports, and scholarly literature. Data were analysed through thematic content analysis to identify recurrent patterns and anomalies in Nigerian federal practice. The study findings reveal a highly centralised federation that significantly departs from true federalism’s cardinal features: substantial subnational autonomy, resource decentralisation, and cooperative intergovernmental relations. Excessive concentration of legislative, administrative, and fiscal powers at the federal centre has undermined state capacity, deepened regional disparities, and fuelled ethnic and political tensions. It is the contention of the study that Nigeria’s federal crisis is primarily institutional and operational rather than conceptual. Conclusively, this study opines that sustainable democratic stability, improved governance, and national unity require far-reaching constitutional reforms to achieve genuine power devolution, equitable fiscal federalism, and robust mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination.